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Introduction
The phenomenological project is developed in contrast to naturalism,
which according to Husserl derives from a certain “rigidification” of the
natural attitude that “reifies” and “absolutizes” the world (Moran 2008:
403). Whereas the natural attitude assumes the existence of the world and
the relationship between mind and world as unproblematic, the phenome-
nological inquiry investigates the conditions of possibility of this relation-
ship. In this way, we achieve the transcendental dimension of conscious-
ness, conceived of as a condition of the possibility for every entity to be
manifest in experience. In the light of this inquiry, nature turns out to be
the correlate of constituting functions of transcendental consciousness. For
this reason, Husserl claims that “[Transcendental consciousness] is not a
component part of Nature, and is so far from being that, that Nature is pos-
sible only as an intentional unity motivated in transcendentally pure con-
sciousness by immanental connections.” (Husserl 1983: 95). Given that
transcendental consciousness constitutes every transcendent being, it can-
not be “naturalized”, because the constituting principle cannot be led to
what it constitutes: “The existence of a Nature cannot be the condition for
the existence of consciousness, since Nature itself turns out to be a corre-
late of consciousness: Nature is only as being constituted in regular con-
catenations of consciousness.” (Husserl 1983: 96).
However, these passages can be seen as the source of hard difficulties
for phenomenology. A fundamental objection is that transcendental phe-
nomenology reaches a concept of “pure” or “absolute” consciousness that
is abstract, disembodied and unnatural, i.e. radically detached from the
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natural world. This would mean, in the end, that Husserl’s phenomenology
leads to a form of idealism or even solipsism and that for it the relationship
between consciousness and nature remains an enigma. 
In order to confront the aforementioned difficulties, one could try to re-
vise the phenomenological perspective to make it compatible with some
form of naturalism. However, to assess the feasibility of the “naturalization
of phenomenology”, we must first clarify the notions of nature and natural-
ism. In the first section of this work, I shall analyze two different forms of
metaphysical naturalism (scientific and naïve), which conceive of nature
as an absolute, mind-independent ontological domain that can be known
as it is “in itself”. I shall therefore analyze the various attempts at natural-
izing consciousness within this approach, arguing that these views are not
compatible with the transcendental framework of phenomenology. In the
second part, I shall consider the genetic development of phenomenology,
arguing that this direction of inquiry leads us to define a form of empirical
naturalism, which constitutes a coherent development of transcendental
phenomenology and leads to a specific way of naturalizing consciousness.
1. Metaphysical naturalism
In this section, I shall define a form of naturalism that is placed at the
base of various attempts at naturalizing consciousness and phenomenolo-
gy. With “metaphysical naturalism” I refer to a view that conceives of na-
ture as a mind-independent ontological domain that can be known as it is
“in itself”, independently of its relationship with a knowing subject. I use
this notion while drawing on the distinction, which is present in Kant, be-
tween two notions of reality: empirical (i.e. relative to the cognitive rela-
tion with a knowing subject) and metaphysical (i.e. absolute, “in itself”).
In particular, I shall distinguish between two forms of metaphysical natu-
ralism, which are each placed at the basis of various attempts at naturaliz-
ing consciousness: scientific naturalism and naïve naturalism.
1.1. Scientific naturalism
With scientific naturalism, I refer to a certain metaphysical interpreta-
tion of the cognitive reach of the natural sciences and in particular of
physics, conceived of as the science that is able to grasp the fundamental
ontology of the natural world. This is a metaphysical form of scientific re-
1 This view is widespread in modern philosophy but it is also challenged by some authors
(e.g. by Thomas Reid).
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alism, which claims the mind-independent reality of the entities that are
posited by physics in order to account for phenomena. Such a view can be
found in modern philosophers such as Galilei and Descartes and is strictly
linked to a certain way of understanding the relationship between quanti-
tative (physical-mathematical) and sensory properties of the objects that
appear in our perceptual experience. In contrast to Aristotle’s ontology, ac-
cording to which qualities such as colors and sounds are part of the “onto-
logical furniture” of the natural world, a widespread view in modern phi-
losophy conceives of these sensory qualities as merely subjective appear-
ances that are “internal” to the mind of the perceiver. In contrast to the
sensory appearances “in the mind”, the physical-mathematical properties
are conceived of as the “primary properties” of the objects that are
grasped through the scientific method1.
This influential view can also be found at play in the contemporary phi-
losophy of mind, being the ontological framework that is taken as the natu-
ralistic starting point of various approaches for the naturalization of the
mind. As David Chalmers asserts, “On the most common conception of na-
ture, the natural world is the physical world.” (Chalmers 2003:102) Ac-
cording to Chalmers, the so-called “hard problem” of phenomenal con-
sciousness (Chalmers 1995) arises when one acknowledges the fact that
“[phenomenal] consciousness fits uneasily into our conception of the nat-
ural world.” (Chalmers 2003: 102). With the concept of “phenomenal con-
sciousness”, Chalmers refers to the subjectively felt dimension of a mental
state, i.e. its qualitative character or “what-it’s-likeness”, in the terminolo-
gy introduced by Thomas Nagel (1974).
Within scientific naturalism, one can attempt to naturalize conscious-
ness by tracing it back to the natural world. The reductionist approach to
the naturalization of the mind identifies the phenomenal states with cer-
tain physical states of the brain. By contrast, the non-reductionist alterna-
tive consists in conceiving of the phenomenal properties of mental states
(qualia) as new, sui generis properties that must be added to the ontologi-
cal furniture of the world, in parallel to the physical-mathematical proper-
ties. This is the view that is developed by Chalmers (1996) with his “fun-
damental theory of consciousness”, arguing for the “natural superve-
nience” or “strong emergence” (Chalmers 2006) of phenomenal conscious-
ness on the physical states of a cognitive system. According to this view,
2 However, it must be noticed that Chalmers (2009) argues for an “ontological anti-real-
ism” that implicitly questions the metaphysical realism and naturalism that was at the basis of
The Conscious Mind.
3 I must clarify that the intepretation of these theories in terms of metaphysical realism and
naturalism is relatively straightforward, but one could also adopt them without taking an explicit
stance on the metaphysics of perception.
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consciousness is a component of the natural world that transcends what is
investigated by physics. When expressed in these terms, this view presup-
poses a metaphysical form of scientific realism, at the same time arguing
that the physicalistic conception of nature must be “enlarged” in order to
make room for the phenomenal properties of mental states2.
1.2. Naïve naturalism
The second option for the naturalization of consciousness and phenome-
nology on the basis of a metaphysically realist conception of nature is
naïve naturalism. With this notion, I refer to the view according to which
the ontology of the natural world includes not only quantitative, physical-
mathematical properties but also the sensory properties with which we are
acquainted in perception. This metaphysical conception of nature can be
based on certain theories of perception when they are understood as theo-
ries about the relationship between mind and world. In particular, naïve
naturalism can be seen as a possible metaphysical implication of both di-
rect realism and externalist representationalism. In contrast to the internal-
ist conception of “qualia”, both these views conceive of the qualitative
properties that appear to us in perception as properties of the external ob-
jects in the environment (qualia externalism)3.
For example, James Gibson’s ecological theory of perception is a form
of direct realism according to which in perception we are directly ac-
quainted with the qualities of the objects in the environment, without the
mediation of internal sensory “contents”. Gibson develops this view with
the aim of supporting naïve realism, i.e. the “naïve belief in the world of
objects and events” and the “simple-minded conviction that our senses
give knowledge of it” (Gibson 1967: 168). Gibson’s view was reprised and
developed by other authors, such as Kevin O’Regan and Alva Noë with
their sensorimotor theory of perception (O’Regan and Noë 2001; Noë and
O’Regan 2002).
Gibson’s direct realism and its reprise by the sensorimotor theory do not
make use of the notion of mental representation. On the contrary, Fred
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Dretske’s representationalist theory of the mind conceives of perception as
involving mental representations. However, in contrast to the traditional
internalism regarding sensory qualities, Dretske argues that mental repre-
sentations are constituted by a vehicle that is internal to the cognitive sys-
tem and whose content is external to the mind. Dretske calls this view
“phenomenal externalism” (Dretske 1996) and develops it within a project
for the “naturalization of the mind” (Dretske 1995) that conceives of na-
ture as endowed with qualitative properties.
For both direct realism and externalist representationalism, nature can
be conceived of as containing more than what is covered by mathematical
physics, being endowed with the sensory qualities that appear to us in per-
ception. On the basis of this qualitative ontology of nature, one can also at-
tempt at naturalizing the mind. 
This strategy has been explored by some proponents of the “naturaliza-
tion of phenomenology”. Jean Petitot and Barry Smith (Petitot 1995, 1999;
Smith 1995; Petitot and Smith 1997) developed a naturalistic version of
phenomenology, which admits the possibility of naturalizing consciousness.
According to these authors, this can be done by enlarging our concept of
nature (Roy et al. 1999: 68), thus pursuing a “phenomenalization of physi-
cal objectivity” (Roy et al. 1999: 55). However, it must be noticed that Peti-
tot is cautious when referring to the issue of realism, claiming that the no-
tion of objective reality can be also interpreted in “Kantian” terms (see Pe-
titot & Smith 1997: 239, 248). This would mean conceiving of “qualitative
ontology” or “phenophysics” as a form of empirical and not metaphysical
realism. By contrast, Barry Smith (Smith 1995; 1999) explicitly conceives
of the qualitative ontology of nature in the terms of metaphysical realism
and he does so by combining a realist interpretation of Husserl’s phenome-
nology with Gibson’s theory of direct perception (Smith 1999: 317 ff.). 
1.3. Metaphysical versus empirical naturalism
Both scientific and naïve naturalism can be interpreted in metaphysical
terms, as ways of reaching the knowledge of an absolute, mind-indepen-
dent reality “in itself”. In this reading, these views are forms of metaphysi-
cal naturalism, which conceive of nature as an ontological domain that can
be known as it is independently of the relationship with a knowing subject.
For scientific naturalism, this domain is the merely quantitative world that
is grasped by mathematical physics, whereas for naïve naturalism it is the
common-sense world made up of the objects of our ordinary experience.
4 Concerning the ontological status of the perceptual object in phenomenology see (Zhok
2013), who compares Husserl’s and Gibson’s theories of perception and stresses affinities but al-
so radical differences between them in relation to the ontology of perception.
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The following step in the naturalistic project consists in attempting at trac-
ing back consciousness to the natural world, by reducing it to certain nat-
ural processes (reductionism) or by conceiving of it as a new feature of the
natural world (natural supervenience or strong emergence). This can be
done by assuming, as ontological base of reduction or of supervenience,
either physical reality (for scientific naturalism) or the qualitative ontology
of nature (for naïve naturalism). 
At this point, I would like to highlight how these forms of metaphysical
naturalism are at odds with the transcendental framework of phenomenolo-
gy, being a non viable option for the naturalization of consciousness. This
is because these views refer to a notion of metaphysical reality that would
be “absolutely transcendent” with respect to the cognitive relationship. On
the contrary, Husserl takes up from Kant the inquiry into the conditions of
the possibility of experience, which leads us to restrict our cognitive reach
to the correlation between subject and object of experience, in contrast to
the possibility of having knowledge of a transcendent reality “in itself”. 
Husserl especially criticizes the metaphysical interpretation of the ob-
ject of physics. This object is theoretically construed through a process of
mathematization of phenomena that separates the “primary” (physical-
mathematical) properties from the sensory properties of the objects that
appear in perceptual experience. The resulting object is a theoretical con-
struction and must not be taken for an objective mind-independent reality
“in itself” (see Husserl 1970: 51). This analysis rules out the scientific
form of metaphysical realism and naturalism, but it can be also applied to
the metaphysical interpretation of the qualitative ontology of nature. Also
in this case, the transcendental analysis of experience rules out the possi-
bility of reifying the object of ordinary experience, turning it into an ab-
solutely mind-independent reality in itself. In fact, according to Husserl
the object of experience is a “relative transcendence”, being relative to
constitutive functions of transcendental consciousness. In contrast to cer-
tain realistic interpretations of phenomenology, within the transcendental
framework of phenomenology the transcendent (or “external”) thing is the
result of a process of constitution in the cognitive process4.
The projects of metaphysical naturalization of the mind can be seen as
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involving two steps: firstly, one “fixes” the ontology of nature; secondly, one
traces back consciousness to the natural domain. The second step is also
very problematic from the point of view of transcendental phenomenology.
In fact, various naturalistic approaches conceive of consciousness as the ob-
ject of psychology, whereas Husserl neatly distinguishes between the object
of psychology and the transcendental dimension of consciousness. Accord-
ing to Husserl, the latter cannot be reduced to the object of a psychological
investigation. Dan Zahavi observes that Husserl clearly “contrasts his own
phenomenology of consciousness with a natural scientific account of con-
sciousness” and for this reason “to suggest that the phenomenological ac-
count could be absorbed, or reduced, or replaced by a naturalistic account
is for Husserl sheer nonsense” (Zahavi 2009: 4-5). This is because “Con-
sciousness rather than merely being an object in the world, is also a subject
for the world, i.e. a necessary condition of possibility for any entity to ap-
pear as an object in the way it does and with the meaning it has” (Zahavi
2010: 5). This point is stressed by Michel Bitbol, who claims that “con-
sciousness is and remains methodologically primary” because “any ascrip-
tion of existence presupposes the existence of conscious experience” (Bitbol
2008: 56-57). For the same reason, Trizio claims the “impossibility in prin-
ciple of naturalizing phenomenology” and that the idea of a naturalized phe-
nomenology “is simply meaningless” (Trizio 2012: 6-7).
However, we have also seen that the neat separation between transcen-
dental consciousness (constituting) and the natural world (constituted) is
the source of hard difficulties for phenomenology, which can be condensed
into the problem of solipsism. This is why we must look at the genetic
broadening of the phenomenological inquiry, which leads us to reframe the
issue of the relationship between consciousness and nature, thus outlining
an alternative to metaphysical naturalism.
2. Genetic phenomenology
The above-seen difficulties of transcendental phenomenology arise
within a level of inquiry that is conceived of by Husserl as not ultimate but
as preliminary to further developments. In fact, the transcendental phe-
nomenology of constitution, which conceives of the objects of the various
regional ontologies as correlating to constituting functions of conscious-
ness, is developed within a fundamental delimitation. Through the phe-
nomenological reduction, experiences are turned into objects of investiga-
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tion, within an inquiry that considers them as unitary acts of perception,
thought, imagination, etc. However, this inquiry explicitly leaves aside the
investigation of the inner temporal unfolding of the experiences. In this
way, the experiences, which have a processual nature, are somehow “artifi-
cially” turned into mental “states”. Conversely, the genetic broadening of
phenomenology “deepens” the investigation of experiences, by investigat-
ing their temporal structure. 
The distinction between two “levels” of the phenomenological inquiry –
static and genetic –, which is central in Husserl’s later works, can already
be found in Ideas I. Here Husserl claims that, “the level of consideration
to which we are confined […] abstains from descending into the obscure
depths of the ultimate consciousness which constitutes all […] temporality
as belongs to mental processes, and instead takes mental processes as they
offer themselves as unitary temporal processes in reflection on what is im-
manent” (Husserl 1983: 171). Husserl clarifies that, in the light of a sub-
sequent broadening of the inquiry, it will turn out that “the transcendental-
ly ‘absolute’ which we have brought about by the reductions is, in truth,
not what is ultimate; it is something which constitutes itself in a certain
profound and completely peculiar sense of its own and which has its pri-
mal source in what is ultimately and truly absolute.” (Husserl 1983: 163).
In the context of Ideas I this passage is enigmatic, pointing towards an in-
quiry that is not further developed in this work. Already there, however,
Husserl seems to suggest that some problematic outcomes of the transcen-
dental phenomenology of constitution should be reconsidered in the light
of a genetic broadening of the inquiry. 
In fact, whereas “static” phenomenology reaches an “absolute” or
“pure” field of transcendental consciousness, “genetic” phenomenology
investigates the genesis of the cognitive process in the life of a concrete,
conscious subject. This is done by investigating the temporal constitution
of the field of consciousness, with its threefold structure of impression-re-
tention-protention. According to Husserl’s analysis of time-consciousness,
each moment of experience is constituted by a primal impression, which is
a qualitative element in the flow of experience, together with the retention
of previous impressions and the protention towards the expected course of
experience. In this way, the analysis of time-consciousness accounts for
the way in which continuously flowing experiences are held together in the
unitary experience of a concrete subject. The unitariness of a concrete
field of manifestation is possible due to the fact that the experiences have
the constant structure of impression-retention-protention. Zahavi (2010:
5 The concept of the co-constitution of subject and object in reciprocal dependence is
placed at the basis of the enactive approach of (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991). These au-
thors take back the notion of “dependent co-arising” from the Madhyamaka philosophy and they
combine it with Husserl’s and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology.
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334-335) stresses the link between the analysis of time-consciousness and
self-awareness. The inquiry into the temporal structure of consciousness
reveals the structure of the pre-reflective self-manifestation of subjectivity,
i.e. how the experiences are self-aware before they are possibly turned into
objects of reflection. The self-manifestation of experiences makes possible
the manifestation of the objects of experience. In this way, genetic phe-
nomenology shows how the process of constitution of objectivity implies
the self-constitution of the subjective pole of the cognitive relation, in a
process of co-constitution of the subject and the object of experience5.
2.1. Phenomenological naturalization
At this point, we can ask about the implications of genetic phenomenol-
ogy for the issue of naturalism. In the light of the genetic broadening of
transcendental phenomenology, the field of transcendental consciousness
turns out to be concretely realized in the experience of a living subject
that is embodied and embedded in the natural world. In fact, the core of
the process of genetic co-constitution of the two poles of the cognitive rela-
tion is the flow of impressions. This qualitative dimension, on the basis of
which the subject and the object of experience are co-constituted, is es-
sentially embodied, taking place in the self-affection of the living body
(Leib), i.e. the body that senses itself in the continuous flow of bodily sen-
sations. According to Bernet (2013), in the phenomenological analysis of
the living body we find what Husserl considers a “legitimate naturalization
of consciousness” (Husserl 1989: 168). 
However, the acknowledgment of the essential bodily grounding of con-
sciousness must be neatly distinguished from the various forms of meta-
physical naturalism. These views presuppose a concept of nature as pre-
constituted and independent from the relation with the cognizing subject.
On the contrary, within the transcendental phenomenological inquiry the
“legitimate naturalization of consciousness” runs in tandem with a com-
plementary process of “phenomenologisation of nature” (Vörös 2014),
which consists in conceiving of nature as the correlate of consciousness in
a process of co-constitution of mind and world.
6 Developments of the phenomenological inquiry in this direction can be found, for exam-
ple., in the works of Merleau-Ponty (1968, 2005) and in the enactive approach of Francisco
Varela and Evan Thompson (Varela, Thompson, Rosch 1991; Varela 1996; Thompson 2007).
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Conclusion
We have seen that, in the light of the transcendental framework of phe-
nomenology, the various forms of metaphysical naturalism are not viable op-
tions for the naturalization of consciousness, since they make use of a con-
cept of nature conceived of as an absolute mind-independent reality that
can be known as it is “in itself”. This concept of nature as absolute reality is
ruled out by the phenomenological analysis of experience. In contrast to
metaphysical naturalism, I have argued that the genetic development of
phenomenology leads to an empirical form of naturalism, which conceives
of nature as the correlate of consciousness in a process of co-constitution of
the subject and the object of experience. This form of phenomenological
naturalism overcomes the difficulties of the static phenomenology of consti-
tution (condensed in the issue of solipsism) and leads us to acknowledge the
natural and bodily grounding of consciousness. In this way, the empirical
naturalism that is based on the genetic development of phenomenology con-
stitutes a fruitful and promising framework for the collaboration between
phenomenological and empirical investigations of the mind6.
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Abstract
Husserl’s phenomenology is developed in explicit contrast to naturalism.
At the same time, various scholars have attempted to overcome this opposi-
tion by naturalizing consciousness and phenomenology. In this paper, I ar-
gue that, in order to confront the issue of the relationship between phenome-
nology and naturalism, we must distinguish between different forms of nat-
uralism. In fact, Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology is developed in
contrast to a metaphysical form of naturalism, which conceives of nature as
a mind-independent ontological domain that can be known as it is “in it-
self”, independently of the cognitive relationship. At the same time, I argue
that the genetic development of phenomenology, through the investigation of
the temporal structure of experiences, leads to an empirical form of natural-
ism, which conceives of nature as the objective pole in a process of co-consti-
tution of the subject and the object of experience.
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